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E-mail address: kriegler@pik-potsdam.deDeveloping models to describe observable systems is a challenge because it can be difﬁcult
to assess and control the discrepancy between the two entities. We consider the situation
of an ensemble of candidate models claiming to accurately describe system features of
interest, and ask the question how beliefs about the accuracy of these models can be
updated in the light of observations. We show that naive Bayesian updating of these beliefs
can lead to spurious results, since the application of Bayes’ rule presupposes the existence
of at least one accurate model in the ensemble. We present a framework in which this
assumption can be dropped. The basic idea is to extend Bayes’ rule to the exhaustive,
but unknown space of all models, and then contract it again to the known set of models
by making best/worst case assumptions for the remaining space. We show that this
approach leads to an e-contamination model for the posterior belief, where the e-contam-
ination is updated along with the distribution of belief across available models. In essence,
the e-contamination provides an additional test on the accuracy of the overall model
ensemble compared to the data, and will grow rapidly if the ensemble fails such a test.
We demonstrate our concept with an example of auto-regressive processes.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
A vital part of the scientiﬁc endeavor consists in developing models for observable systems. Obviously, a model can never
be an identical copy of such a system, but rather a proxy to understand some system feature, on the basis of which future
observations of this feature may be predicted. In order to construct a useful model, it is important to control the discrepancy
between model and observable system in a way that allows the model to have some predictive power. Therefore, it is ex-
tremely helpful if the system can be studied in laboratory experiments where the experimenter can force her ways on it
to test the model. However, controlling the discrepancy becomes an enormous challenge if the system is not accessible to
laboratory studies. The situation is further exacerbated if available observations cover only a small part of the phase space.
The climate system and computer models of it are a perfect example, and we will have this example in mind in what follows.
1.1. The concept of predictive accuracy
Models are usually constructed by combining scientiﬁc knowledge about fundamental system properties with statistical
inference from system measurements. Here, we are concerned with the ability of such models to predict a certain system
feature. Let the observations of the system feature at discrete points in time be described by a stochastic process. All rights reserved.
esearch, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany.
584 E. Kriegler / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 583–596Y :¼ fY1;Y2; . . .g, with Yi : XY ! R a random variable. Any set of recorded observations yðTÞ :¼ fy1; . . . ; yTg over a ﬁnite time
period represents a realization or time series of YðTÞ :¼ fY1; . . . ;YTg. Likewise, any (in general dynamic) model of the system
feature of interest constitutes a time-discrete stochastic process F :¼ fF1; F2; . . .g, with Fi : XF ! R a random variable. Any
model simulation f ðTÞ ¼ ff1; . . . ; fTg is a realization or time series of FðTÞ :¼ fF1; . . . ; FTg. The discrepancy between observa-
tions and model is described by the stochastic process D ¼ Y  F . The statistical properties of the discrepancy D will deter-
mine the accuracy of the model F in predicting the observations Y . In statistics, the notion of accuracy loosely refers to the
degree of conformity of an estimated (statistical) quantity to its actual value. In our case, it shall refer to the degree of con-
formity of a simulated model realization ft , t > t0, to the observation of a system feature Yt . The direct reference to Yt dis-
tinguishes the concept of accuracy from the concept of forecast skill used, e.g. in weather prediction. Such forecast skills
measure the performance of the model compared to some baseline forecasting technique [8, Chapter 18]. Thus, models
can exhibit positive skill even if their discrepancy to the observations is large, provided that the baseline technique is even
more inaccurate. Model accuracy is a stronger concept, and more difﬁcult to evaluate than forecast skill.
A model F may be called accurate in its prediction up to some point T in the future, if knowledge of (i) system observa-
tions y1; . . . ; yT up to the present point in time T, and (ii) a model simulation f1; . . . ; fT up to the forecast horizon T
 sufﬁces to
estimate the probability of observing Yt 6 y for arbitrary T < t 6 T and y 2 R. Thus, we must be able to estimate the distri-
bution of the discrepancy Dt ¼ Yt  ft , T < t 6 T, within reasonable error, from the observed discrepancy
fd1 ¼ y1  f1; . . . ; dT ¼ yT  fTg.
The qualitative requirements (i) and (ii) leave some leeway for deﬁning the predictive accuracy of models, and an exact
deﬁnition might be tailored to the application. Since the emphasis of this study is on the demonstration of a new concept to
account for model discrepancy in Bayesian updating, we do not undertake the (perhaps futile) task to identify conditions on
model discrepancy D that would satisfy a general notion of predictive accuracy. Instead, we restrict ourselves to an impor-
tant subset of stochastic processes, i.e. stationary auto-regressive (AR) Gaussian processes constructed from white noise 
(consisting of a sequence of iid normal random variables t  Nð0;rÞ). Such processes are a subclass of linear processes that
provide a general framework for studying stationary processes [2, Chapter 2.2]. We have chosen to restrict us to AR processes
since they are commonly used in many disciplines, including climatology [8]. Zð~a;rÞ ¼ fZ1; Z2; . . .g is an AR process of order
m (with zero mean) ifZt :¼
Xm
i¼1
ai Zti þ t ; ð1Þwhere ~a :¼ ða1; . . . ;amÞ are non-zero real-valued parameters characterizing the process. To simplify notation, we will drop
the vector sign in the following. Conditions for stationarity and some other fundamental properties of AR(m) processes
are discussed in Appendix A.
Deﬁnition 1. Amodel F is called an accurate predictor of future observations YðT  TÞ :¼ fYTþ1; . . . ;YT g if and only if (i) the
discrepancy DðTÞ ¼ YðTÞ  FðTÞ is statistically indistinguishable from a segment of a stationary AR(m) process Zða;rÞ
(with zero mean), and (ii) the parameters a, r characterizing Zða;rÞ can be deduced, in principle, from the observed
discrepancy during the period f1; . . . ; Tg.
The second requirement effectively restricts the persistence of auto-correlations and the order of eligible AR(m) pro-
cesses. Appendix A discusses these restrictions in greater detail and provides two quantitative constraints (A.5) and
(A.11) on eligible AR(m) processes. It is useful to consider the stochastic process Zða;rÞ a part of the model formulation.
Hence, a model may be thought of as a couple fFðhFÞ;Zða;rÞg characterized by parameters h ¼ ðhF ;a;rÞ, where the model
parameters hF may be a vector of arbitrary but ﬁnite length. The couple describes the observations in terms of
XðhÞ ¼ FðhFÞ þ Zða;rÞ. Then, an ensemble of candidate models can be deﬁned in terms of a set of available parameter con-
stellations H. Since the class of all stationary AR(m) processes is very large, constraints (A.5) and (A.11) emanating from our
deﬁnition of an accurate predictor are crucial for keeping the size of the ensemble of candidate models within practicable
bounds. We will denote an accurate predictor in the model ensemble by S :¼ XðhÞ, and the discrepancy of such an accurate
model by D :¼ Zða;rÞ. Our deﬁnition includes the assumption that D is white noise (a ¼ 0).
There exists an analytical expression for the conditional probability that an observed discrepancy dðTÞ is a realization of
an AR(m) process (see Eq. (A.9)). Knowledge of the conditional probability allows deriving a likelihood function on the do-
main of available models h 2 H, which can then be used in the process of updating beliefs about model accuracy.
1.2. Updating beliefs about predictive accuracy
Assume we have an ensemble of model hypotheses XðhÞ, with h 2 H indexing the available models, and some system data
yðTÞ, from which we want to learn about the relationship between XðhÞ and an accurate model S. If a probability
PðXðhÞ ¼ SjyðTÞÞ is sought, we have to turn to Bayesian statistics. In our case, this requires to
(1) derive a likelihood functionLðh; yðTÞÞ  pðyðTÞjhÞ, i.e., the probability of observing yðTÞ for a given model XðhÞ under
the assumption that XðhÞ constitutes an accurate predictor (which deﬁnes the likelihood function given our assump-
tion about the discrepancy Y  S ¼ Zða;rÞ), and
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XðhÞ constituting an accurate model S.
However, this approach requires us to make the assumption that S is contained in our model ensemble with certainty as
evident from Bayes’ rule1 WepðhjyðTÞÞ ¼Lðh; yðTÞÞpðhÞ
pðyðTÞÞ with pðyðTÞÞ :¼
Z
h
Lðh; yðTÞÞpðhÞdh; ð2Þwhere the denominator assures that the posterior probability is normalized. We will call the assumption that the prior and
posterior beliefs entertain an accurate predictor (
R
H pðhÞdh ¼
R
H pðhjyðTÞÞdh ¼ 1) closed world assumption.
We believe that this assumption is at odds with the open nature of the scientiﬁc endeavor, where a set of possible models
fXðhÞjh 2 Hg imagined at some initial time is usually expanded as more data is obtained. More precisely, the model devel-
opment process consists in (I) expanding the set H of known models, and (II) updating our belief about model accuracy
acrossH. Obviously, only the later type (II) learning can be described in terms of Bayesian learning. The former type (I) learn-
ing may be informed by Bayesian inference, but seems to be complementary to it, since it relates to the emergence of positive
belief in an area of the model space that was not supported by the prior belief.
Deriving a general framework encompassing both type (I) and Bayesian learning will be a formidable challenge. In this
paper, we aim at the more modest goal of including an indicator for the necessity of type (I) learning into the updating pro-
cess. Naive application of Bayesian learning without contemplating the possibility that the model ensemble fXðhÞjh 2 Hg
might not contain an accurate predictor can lead to spurious results. As the amount of data yðTÞ increases, the likelihood
function tends to sharpen, and updating by means of Eq. (2) will decrease the spread of the posterior belief that a given mod-
el XðhÞ coincides with the accurate model S. Hence, an analyst ignoring anything else will converge in her belief on some
model XðhÞ. As a consequence, her predictions of real system features will grow more (over)conﬁdent – even if they are
off the mark. This paradoxical behavior is a consequence of the closed world assumption. It is therefore desirable to drop
this assumption, and to include an indicator for S R fXðhÞjh 2 Hg in the updating process.
A similar concern about Bayesian learning on model quality and the use of posterior beliefs for predicting future obser-
vations has been raised by Draper [3] and, more recently, Goldstein and Rougier [4,5]. Draper criticizes the practice of
neglecting structural uncertainty, and proposes to extend prior and likelihood to the space of possible model structures.
His approach leads to an increased spread of the posterior on the model ensemble. Goldstein and Rougier [4,5] highlight
the importance of assessing the discrepancy between the ensemble of available models and the ‘ideal’ reference model
which captures the system up to an additive noise term. They offer guidelines how a meta-model of the discrepancy might
be constructed. Obviously, this is a very challenging task, as it is in essence an attempt to include type (I) learning in the
updating process. As indicated above, we take a less ambitious approach, and only seek to include an indicator for the exis-
tence of model discrepancy impinging on the predictive accuracy of the model ensemble.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example of auto-regressive (AR) processes in which the
application of standard Bayesian updating is shown to fail. Section 3 contains the core of the paper, detailing our derivation
of an extension of Bayes’ rule that allows to drop the closed world assumption. This rule is put into operation for our example
of AR processes in Section 4. We conclude by assessing the challenges for real-world applications. An earlier version of this
work was presented at the ISIPTA’07 conference [7], but the current paper includes several improvements since then.
2. Limitations of Bayes’ rule: example of auto-regressive processes
Let the observations of a system feature be described by a stationary AR(2) process:YðTÞ ¼ ðY1; . . . ; YTÞ with Yt ¼ a1Yt1 þ a2Yt2 þ nt
nt  Nð0;rÞ white noise:
ð3ÞThe AR(2) process is stationary iff a1 þ a2 < 1, a2  a1 < 1, and ja2j < 1 [8, Chapter 10]. Let us assume that the model hypoth-
eses for YðTÞ are restricted to a closed set of stationary AR(1)-processes with noise term nt  Nð0;rÞ:fXða1Þ :¼ ðX1; . . . ;XTÞjXt ¼ a1Xt1 þ nt ; ja1j 6 a; a :¼ 0:995g: ð4Þ
We tacitly assume that the standard deviation r of the additive white noise term in the observations is perfectly known, and
therefore does not constitute a free parameter of the model ensemble. This assumption is only reasonable if the white noise
term in the observations can be observed independently of YðTÞ. Here, we make this assumption for the purpose of providing
a simple example of the potential pitfalls of Bayesian updating of a model ensemble that lacks an accurate predictor. The
model ensemble deﬁned in Eq. (4) contains an accurate predictor S if and only if a1 2 ½a; a and a2 ¼ 0.
It is well known from the theory of forecasting stationary Gaussian time series that normally distributed linear predictors
Phn for forecasting a future realization yTþh from knowledge of the past n realizations yðnÞ ¼ fyT ; . . . ; yTnþ1g can beassume throughout the paper thatH#Rn is a continuous space, and that a prior probability measure P : rðHÞ ! ½0; 1 over a r-ﬁeld ofH is continuous.
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process with parameters r, a1; . . . ;am conditional on the last realization yT is given byTable 1
Deﬁniti
(ii) the
predicto
a2
All proc
rY
y1
y2
aeq;1
req;1pðyTþhjyTÞ  N qhyT ; r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 q2h
1Pmi¼1aiqi
s !
; ð5Þwhere Ph1ðytÞ ¼ qhyT is the best h-step prediction taking into account only the last realization yT (n ¼ 1), and qi is the auto-
correlation function at lag i of the AR(m) process. For qh > 0 or h an odd number, the conditional distribution is identical to a
prediction based on the assumption of an AR(1) process with parameters aeq, req:pðyTþhjyTÞ  N aheq;hyT ; req;h
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 a2heq;h
1 a2eq;h
vuut
0
@
1
A;
with aeq;h :¼ ðsgnðqhÞÞhjqhj
1
h; req;h :¼ r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 q2=hh
1Pmi¼1aiqi
s
:
ð6ÞFor example, if the observations are described by an AR(2) process, the AR(1) representation performing like the best linear
predictor Ph¼1;1 for the next observation yTþ1 is given byaeq;1 ¼ a11 a2 ; req;1 ¼ r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
1 a22
s
: ð7ÞHence, an AR(1) hypothesis for predicting future realizations of an AR(2) process can be optimized to reproduce the perfor-
mance of Ph1. However, in the example presented here we not only restrict the ensemble of model hypothesis to AR(1) pro-
cesses, but also require that the assumed standard deviation of the white noise is ﬁxed at the value r. This additional
restriction precludes the possibility that the AR(1) assumption can be optimized to match the performance of the best linear
predictor Ph1 characterized in Eq. (5) for any hP 1.
After having received a realization yðTÞ of YðTÞ, we can apply Bayesian updating to our prior belief about the accuracy of
the model hypotheses Xða1Þ, ja1j 6 a, as deﬁned by a probability density pða1Þ. For keeping the example simple, let the prior
pða1Þ be uniformly distributed on ½a; a. As shown in Appendix B, the likelihood of having obtained the realization yðTÞ from
an AR(1) process with parameter a1 and known variance r of the white noise is given byLða1; yðTÞÞ  N a^ðTÞ
1 b^ðTÞ ;
r^ðTÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 b^ðTÞ
q
0
B@
1
CA; ð8Þwhere a^ðTÞ, r^ðTÞ, and b^ðTÞ are estimated from the observed time series yðTÞ as deﬁned in Eqs. (B.1) and (B.2). Application of
Bayes rule (Eq. (2)) to a uniform prior for a1 yields the posterior probability density on ½a; a:pða1jyðTÞÞ ¼
exp  1b^ðTÞ
2r^ðTÞ2 a1 
a^ðTÞ
1b^ðTÞ
 2 
R a
a exp  1b^ðTÞ2r^ðTÞ2 a1 
a^ðTÞ
1b^ðTÞ
 2 
da1
: ð9ÞEq. (9) can be used to test the effect of the closed world assumption on the Bayesian updating process. For the experiment,
we generated 200 time series yðTÞ with length T ¼ 5000 for four different AR(2)-processes described in Table 1. All AR(2)
processes share the same a1 parameter and the same variance of the white noise term. We recall that any segment of a
Gaussian AR(m) process is normally distributed  Nð0;rYÞ, with rY ¼ r=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1Pmi¼1aiqiq , and qi the auto-correlation of
lag i [8, Chapter 10].on of the four AR(2) processes that model the observations assumed in the example. Also shown are (i) the standard deviation rY of the AR(2) processes,
roots y1, y2 of the characteristic polynomial, and (iii) the parameters aeq;1 and req;1 of the AR(1) processes that would perform like the best linear
r P11 (cmp. Eq. (7)).
0.9 0.3 0 0.06
esses: a1 ¼ 0:86, r ¼ 1
2.57 1.40 1.96 2.48
0:48þ 0:94i 1:43þ 1:13i 1.16 1.08
0:48 0:94i 1:43 1:13i – 15.41
0.45 0.66 0.86 0.91
2.29 1.05 1 1.00
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AR(1) hypothesis a1 ¼ aeq;1 that will perform almost identical to the best linear predictor P11, and even similar to the pre-
dictors Ph1 for h > 1 within 10%. Thus, it has an almost accurate predictor in the model ensemble. The reason is that this
AR(2) process is characterized by two modes of auto-correlation, a slowly decaying and a rapidly decaying alternating mode,
where the latter can be neglected (see Appendix A for the characteristics of the auto-correlation function in terms of the
roots of the characteristic polynomial). The AR(2) processes with negative a2 are characterized by a damped oscillatory
auto-correlation. In these cases it can be seen that the standard deviation req;1 of the noise term of the AR(1) process which
would perform like the best linear predictor P11 departs increasingly from the value r ¼ 1 allowed for our model ensemble
Xða1Þ, ja1j 6 a.
Fig. 1 shows the result of Bayesian updating for the four different AR(2) processes. We have updated the belief about a1
(see Eq. (9)) after each 20 new observations. Shown is the development of the 90% ‘‘conﬁdence limits” for the mean value of
the posterior distribution. These limits were calculated as the 10th lowest and 190th highest mean of the 200 posterior dis-
tributions that were derived from the sample of 200 time series used for the updating process. It can be seen that the pos-
terior mean converges to the correct value of a1 ¼ 0:86 (horizontal solid line) in the case where the observations are
described by an AR(1) process (a2 ¼ 0). In the other cases, the posterior mean converges to the value aeq of the AR(1) process
that performs like the best linear predictor P11. However, only in the case a2 ¼ 0:06, and to a lesser extent a2 ¼ 0:3 will this
lead to predictions of future realizations that behave similar to P11 (compare req;1 and r in Table 1). In the extreme case
a2 ¼ 0:9, the variance of the next observation around the predicted value will be strongly underestimated.
We brieﬂy assess the consequences for predicting the observation yTþ4 h ¼ 4 time steps ahead from the past observation
yT . For convenience, we assume in the following that yT ¼ 0, i.e. the mean value of Yt . If our belief about a1 is described by the
posterior pða1; yðTÞÞ, our prediction for the distribution of system observations at time T þ 4 based on past data yðTÞ (with
yT ¼ 0) is described byFig. 1.
posterio
perform
observapðyTþ4jyðTÞÞ ¼
Z a
a
pðyTþ4jyT ¼ 0;a1Þ pða1jyðTÞÞ da1; ð10Þwhere pðyTþ4jyT ¼ 0;a1Þ is given by Eq. (6). Fig. 2 shows predictions for the case of learning from a realization of the AR(1)
process with a1 ¼ 0:86 and a2 ¼ 0. The dotted line depicts the prediction on the basis of the uniform prior, before any learn-
ing occurred. Interestingly, the assumption of the uniform prior strongly underestimates the probability mass in the ﬂanks of
the distribution. The example shows that the uniform prior does not warrant a conservative (or non-informative) choice of
belief in general. After updating with observations yðTÞ the predictions converge to the conditional distribution
pðyTþ4jyT ¼ 0Þ.
Bayesian learning is much less successful when the stochastic process describing the observations strongly deviates
from the AR(1) assumption (a2 ¼ 0:9). As depicted in Fig. 3, updating with observations yðTÞ leads to a further decrease
in variance of the prediction of yTþ4 compared to the prediction based on the uniform prior. This is exactly the opposite of
what should happen, because the true distribution of observing yTþ4 conditional on having observed yT ¼ 0 exhibits a
much larger spread than the prior prediction. What makes matters worse, no amount of additional data will be able to
rectify the situation. In contrast, the posterior belief will continue to sharpen, and the spread of the prediction will
decrease further.Updated belief about the parameter a1 of an hypothetical AR(1) process after T observations. The 90% ‘‘conﬁdence limits” for the mean value of the
r belief (derived from the sample of 200 time series) are plotted. Horizontal lines indicate the parameter value aeq of the AR(1) process that
s like the best linear predictor P11. Black dots on the right axis indicate the range between the 5% and 95% quantiles of the posterior belief after 5000
tions.
Fig. 2. Prediction of the next observation yTþ4 based on the belief about a1 for the case a1 ¼ 0:86 and a2 ¼ 0. The solid line shows the true distribution of the
observations yTþ4 conditional on yT . Dashed and solid line fall onto each other.
Fig. 3. Prediction of the next observation yTþ4 based on the belief about a1 for the case a1 ¼ 0:86 and a2 ¼ 0:9.
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Given the spurious results that can emerge from a naive application of Bayes’ rule, we are looking for an extension of
Bayesian updating that allows us to drop the assumption that an accurate model S has to be included in the set of available
models XðhÞ; h 2 H with certainty. A natural ﬁrst step in this direction is to extend Bayes’ rule to a larger space X  H for
which the assumption S ¼ XðxÞ will be true for at least one x 2 X. Similar extensions are also the starting points for the
proposals by Draper [3] and Goldstein and Rougier [5]. We assert that such a hypothetical space X is constituted by the space
of all models, known and unknown. We think of X as a continuous vector space with large, but ﬁnite dimension that contains
the parameter vectors x for a large, but ﬁnite list of time-discrete equations and relations. A reduced list of parameterized
equations is characterized in this space by ﬁxing the parameter values in some dimensions (collected in w), and allowing to
vary – within bounds – the remaining parameters h. Hence, a choice of model ensemble Xðh;w0Þ; h 2 H, deﬁnes a Cartesian
product X ¼ HW, where the parameters w 2 W are ﬁxed at w0, and only h 2 H can be varied.
3.1. Incorporating the assumption of unknown models
The nature of models in the residual space H ðW fw0gÞ is completely unknown. Thus, our prior belief about the accu-
racy of unknownmodels in that space is vacuous. Fortunately, imprecise probability theory allows to capture complete igno-
rance in terms of the vacuous probability modelVðH ðW fw0gÞÞ comprising the set of all probability distributions with
support onH ðW fw0gÞ [9, Chapter 2.9.1]. Since the complement spaceH fw0g has zero measure,VðH ðW fw0gÞÞ is
identical to VðHWÞ almost everywhere. Thus, we can continue to use the latter vacuous probability in what follows.
E. Kriegler / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 583–596 589We assume that our prior belief about the ‘known’ model ensemble Xðh;w0Þ; h 2 H is described by mðh;w0Þ. How should
we combine this prior belief with the vacuous belief on the complementary space? It seems to be a precondition of human
agency that we assign non-zero probability to our conception of the ‘real world’ even though it exists on a space with zero
measure, i.e.,mðh;wÞ 2 p0 mðh;w0Þ dðw w0Þ þ ð1 p0Þ VðHWÞ; ð11Þ
where dðw w0Þ denotes the Dirac measure concentrating probability mass on w ¼ w0, i.e., the set of models available to us.
The probability 0 6 p0 6 1 weighs our prior belief across the two different domains of knowledge, and may be associated
with the prior level of conﬁdence that the model ensemble Xðh;w0Þ; h 2 H can accurately describe the system observations
of interest. For p0 ¼ 1, we completely ignore the possibility that the accurate model may still be unknown. This choice
reﬂects the closed world assumption underlying the standard application of Bayesian learning. In the other extreme,
p0 ¼ 0, we are completely lost in the unknown, and cannot expect to learn anything from whatever data we receive. Here,
we suggest to choose p0 as to reﬂect a typical conﬁdence level used in statistics, e.g., p0 ¼ 0:95. However, the choice of p0 will
not inﬂuence the posterior belief signiﬁcantly (see Eq. (18)) as long as it is not set to the extreme values of 0 or 1.
Since we cannot talk in positive terms about what we do not know, we are not searching for the posterior belief
mðh;wjyðTÞÞ on the space of all models, but rather for its marginal distribution pðhjyðTÞÞ on the subspace of known models.
After receiving an observed time series yðTÞ, Bayes’ rule yieldspðhjyðTÞÞ ¼
R
WLðh;w; yðTÞÞ mðh;wÞ dwR
WHLðh;w; yðTÞÞ mðh;wÞ dwdh
: ð12ÞWe follow the usual practice to normalize the likelihood on the space of known models to one. Hence, we divide both the
nominator and denominator by the maximum likelihood Lðh0;w0; yðTÞÞ on the model ensemble Xðh;w0Þ; h 2 H. Inserting
the prior belief described into above expression, we ﬁndpðhjyðTÞÞ 2 p0lLðhÞ þ ð1 p0ÞVLðHÞR
H p0lLðhÞ þ ð1 p0ÞVLðHÞ
 
dh
;
lLðhÞ :¼
Lðh;w0; yðTÞÞ
Lðh0;w0; yðTÞÞ
mðh;w0Þ; VLðHÞ :¼
Z
W
Lðh;w; yðTÞÞ
Lðh0;w0; yðTÞÞ
VðHWÞdw;
ð13Þwhere VLðHÞ is the unknown set of marginals on H that emerge from multiplying all prior probability distributions on
HW with an unknown likelihood function. Note that it is not a vacuous probability model itself, since its elements are
not normalized.
For the derivation of our main result, we need to require that the unknown likelihoodLðh;w; yðTÞÞ is a L1-integrable func-
tion for ﬁnite T. Let us ﬁrst consider some arbitrary prior mðh;wÞ 2VðHWÞ, instead of the entire class of all possible prior
probabilities VðHWÞ. Due to the L1 integrability of the likelihood function, the integralk :¼
Z
H
Z
W
Lðh;w; yðTÞÞ
Lðh0;w0; yðTÞÞ
mðh;wÞ dwdh ð14Þexists, with k 2 Rþ0 an unknown number. Lower and upper bounds for k can be calculated from the set of extreme points of
the vacuous probability model VðHWÞ, comprising the Dirac measures dðh ~hÞ dðw ~wÞ; ð~h; ~wÞ 2 HW. For arbitrary
likelihood functions Lðh;w; yðTÞÞ, we ﬁnd0 6
Z
H
VLðHÞ dh 6LðTÞ with LðTÞ :¼ maxðh;wÞ2HW
Lðh;w; yðTÞÞ
Lðh0;w0; yðTÞÞ
; ð15Þwhere the lower bound is set up by a Dirac prior in a region of inﬁnitesimally small likelihood, and the upper bound by the
Dirac prior dðh hÞdðw wÞ centered on the point of maximum likelihood ðh;wÞ. For T !1, the point of maximum like-
lihood will signify the accurate predictor, i.e. S :¼ Xðh;wÞ. Since the likelihood function concentrates on ðh;wÞ as the num-
ber of observations increases, the likelihood ratioLðTÞwill grow towards inﬁnity for T !1, if the accurate predictor is not
contained in the ensemble of available models, i.e. ðh;wÞ–ðh0;w0Þ.
Given 0 6 k 6LðTÞ, we can expressZ
W
Lðh;w; yðTÞÞ
Lðh0;w0; yðTÞÞ
mðh;wÞdw ¼ k~mðhÞ; ð16Þwith the likelihood-scaled marginal prior probability deﬁned as~mðhÞ :¼
Z
W
Lðh;w; yðTÞÞ
Lðh0;w0; yðTÞÞ
mðh;wÞ dw
 
=k:Since the likelihood functionLðh;w; yðTÞÞ over the extended space of all models, known and unknown, is by deﬁnition un-
known itself, the only thing we can say about the marginal prior probability ~mðhÞ is that it is contained in the setVðHÞ of all
probabilities on the space of available models H w0.
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Xðh;w0Þ, h 2 H, that integrates our ignorance about the likelihood on the space of unknown models. By inserting Eqs. (14)–
(16) into the extended Bayes rule (13) (assuming a single prior probability mðh;wÞ rather than the vacuous probability
VðHWÞ), we ﬁnd:pðhjyðTÞ; kÞ 2 ð1 eðk; p0ÞÞ
lLðhÞR
H lLðhÞdh
þ eðk;p0ÞVðHÞ; ð17Þ
eðk;p0Þ :¼
ð1 p0Þk
p0
R
H lLðhÞdhþ ð1 p0Þk
with 0 6 k 6LðTÞ: ð18ÞEq. (17) separates the posterior belief into a weighted sum of (i) a term concerned with updating the prior belief on the mod-
el ensemble Xðh;w0Þ; h 2 H (the original Bayes’ rule), and (ii) a term summarizing the contribution from the residual space of
unknown models. Since the latter term comprises the vacuous probability modelVðHÞ, the posterior belief is described by a
so-called e-contamination model, which mixes VðHÞ into a precise posterior probability with contamination eðk; p0Þ. The
e-contamination model has been investigated extensively in the context of robust Bayesian and imprecise probability
approaches (see, e.g., [1]). It is a tractable model, since it can be easily characterized by its set of extreme points or its
coherent lower probability constituting a belief function. Note that we can recover the standard case of Bayesian learning
under the closed world assumption from Eqs. (17) and (18) by choosing p0 ¼ 1, implying eðk; p0Þ ¼ 0.
As a ﬁnal step, we need to account for the fact that the prior mðh;wÞ over the space of unknown models is unknown itself,
and therefore can be any element of the vacuous probability modelVðHWÞ (see Eq. (13)). Hence, the full posterior belief
will be described by the union of e-contamination models (17) for all 0 6 k 6LðTÞ. Since eðk1; p0Þ > eðk2; p0Þ for k1 > k2, the
e-contamination models are nested in k, and their union for all 0 6 k 6LðTÞ equals the e-contamination model for the larg-
est k-valueLðTÞ. Hence, the full posterior belief accounting for our complete ignorance on the space of unknown models is
given bypðhjyðTÞÞ 2 ð1 eðLðTÞ;p0ÞÞ
lLðhÞR
H lLðhÞdh
þ eðLðTÞ;p0ÞVðHÞ: ð19ÞEq. (19) constitutes the main result of this paper. It provides an open version of Bayes’ rule (for p0 < 1) accounting for the fact
that the ensemble of available models XðhÞ; h 2 Hmight not contain an accurate predictor S. In this case, as discussed above,
we have LðTÞ ! 1 and consequently eðLðTÞ; p0Þ ! 1 for T !1. Thus, the posterior belief will become more and more
vacuous as the number of observations grows, providing a built-in indicator for the analyst that model discrepancy impinges
on the predictive accuracy of the overall model ensemble, effectively requiring her to enlarge the model ensemble before
continuing the updating process.
3.2. Updating the contamination factor
The usefulness of the extended Bayes’ rule (19) will depend on the estimation ofLðTÞ determining the behavior of the
contamination eðLðTÞ; p0Þ as new observations are obtained. In general, we expect the likelihoodLðh;w; yðTÞÞ to be largest
at an unknown point ðh;wÞ where an accurate predictor S ¼ Xðh;wÞ is located. The probability that it will be otherwise
becomes inﬁnitesimal as T !1. Hence, we assert that LðTÞ is obtained at the point ðh;wÞ. Due to our deﬁnition of an
accurate predictor, we know that Y  FðhF ;wÞ ¼ Zða;rÞ is an AR(m) process. Thus, given an observation
yðTÞ ¼ ðy1; . . . ; ynÞ, we ﬁnd for large T thatLðTÞ will be a realization of the random variable (with r2 RðaÞ the auto-covari-
ance matrix of an AR(m) process)LðT;a;rÞ :¼
ð2pr2ÞT2 RðaÞj j12 exp  12r2 ðZðTÞÞ0RðaÞ1ZðTÞ
 
Lðh0;w0; yðTÞÞ
¼ r
0T2 Rða0Þj j12
rT2 RðaÞj j12
exp 1
2
ðZðTÞÞ0RðaÞ1ZðTÞ
r2
 s^ðh0; TÞ
 ! !
with s^ðh0; TÞ :¼ yðTÞ  f ðh
0
F ;w0Þ
 0Rða0Þ1 yðTÞ  f ðh0F ;w0Þ 
r02
;
ð20Þfor some (unknown) values a ¼ a, r ¼ r. The denominator includes the likelihood of the ‘best’ model Xðh0;w0Þ in our model
ensemble (cmp. Eq. (15)). Eq. (20) can be simpliﬁed by factorizing the joint distribution with a Cholesky decomposition of the
auto-covariance matrix (Eq. (A.9)):LðT;a;rÞ ¼ P
T
t¼1d
0
t
PTt¼1dt
exp 1
2
XT
t¼1
2t  s^ðh0; TÞ
 ! !
with s^ðh0; TÞ ¼
XT
t¼1
yt  ftðh0F ;w0Þ  m0t
 2
d02t
;
ð21Þwhere t  Nð0;1Þ is normal with unit variance, and the means mt and standard deviations dt resulting from the whitening
transformation are deﬁned in Eq. (A.9). While dt , mt depend on the unknown parameters a ¼ a and r ¼ r of the AR(m)
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discrepancy yðTÞ  f ðh0F ;w0Þ of the best available model Xðh0;w0Þ. Since dt ¼ r and d0t ¼ r0 for t > m, and in general T 	 m (see
constraint (A.11)), the distribution of the random variable LðT;a;rÞ can be approximated byLðT;rÞ ¼ r
0
r
 T
exp 1
2
sðTÞ  s^ðh0; TÞð Þ
 
; with sðTÞ :¼
XT
t¼1
2t ; ð22Þwhere LðT;rÞ no longer depends on the (unknown) process parameters a ¼ a of the accurate predictor. Although Eq. (22)
describes a set of random variables fLðT;rÞjr 2 Rþ0 g underlying LðTÞ, we cannot use it to estimate the value of r, or to
deduce the actual realizationLðTÞ. This is due to fact that the discrepancy between the observations yðTÞ and a hypothetical
accurate simulation f ðhF ;wÞ remains unknown. In this situation, it is unclear how the concept of Bayesian updating could be
extended to the estimation ofLðTÞ, which would be necessary to transform the open Bayes’ rule (19) into a closed expres-
sion allowing to update prior beliefs solely on the basis of the recorded observations yðTÞ.
In order to resolve this dilemma, we switch to a more heuristic approach. Unlike the data-model discrepancy of the accu-
rate predictor, the discrepancy dðh0FÞ ¼ yðTÞ  f ðh0F ;w0Þ between the observations and the ‘best’ available model is known.
Hence, we may start on the assumption that there exists some eligible AR(m) process Zða0;r0Þ (see constraints (A.5) and
(A.11)) which renders the ‘best’ available model an accurate predictor, and only abandon this assumption if the observations
tell us otherwise. This approach is akin to a statistical test, where a null hypothesis is to be rejected at some signiﬁcance level
chosen to limit the probability of Type I errors. We acknowledge that such an approach is difﬁcult to reconcile with the gen-
eral concept of Bayesian updating. However, in the absence of more promising approaches we continue along this path for
the time being.
If dðh0FÞ is statistically indistinguishable from a realization of some eligible AR(m) process Zða0;r0Þ, then its least square
sum s^ðh0; TÞ in Eq. (21) constitutes a realization ofs0ðTÞ :¼
XT
t¼1
02t  v2T ; 0t  Nð0;1Þ: ð23ÞIn this case, the random variable LðT;rÞ describes the difference sðTÞ  s0ðTÞ between draws from a v2T distribution. Since v2T
becomes approximately normal for T !1, it can be seen that sðTÞ  s0ðTÞwill also be approximately normal with zero mean
and variance!1. This shows that any estimate EðsðTÞÞ 2 Rþ that would allow us to derive a proxy EðLðTÞÞ replacingLðTÞ
in Eq. (19) needs to be carefully chosen. If Xðh0;w0Þ ¼ S is an accurate predictor, EðLðTÞÞ must not approach zero or inﬁnity
with equal probability for T !1. Therefore, we select a quantile sqðTÞ of the v2T-distribution, i.e.Z sqðTÞ
0
v2TðsÞ ds :¼ q;that will be larger than the realization s^ðh0; TÞ with probability q if Xðh0;w0Þ ¼ S, and use it to deﬁne a proxy EðLðTÞ; qÞ from
Eq. (22):EðLðTÞ; qÞ :¼ exp  T
2
sqðTÞ
T
 s^ðh
0; TÞ
T
 2ðlnr0  lnrÞ
  

 exp  T
2
sqðTÞ
T
 s^ðh
0; TÞ
T
  
; ð24Þwhere we have made the additional assumption that lnr0 
 lnr. The proxy EðLðTÞ; qÞ has favorable asymptotic properties
for T !1. If Xðh0;w0Þ ¼ S, we have EðLðTÞ; qÞ ! 0 with probability q, and if Xðh0;w0Þ–S, EðLðTÞ; qÞ ! 1 with almost unit
probability. Eq. (24) constitutes the ﬁnal building block for our extension of Bayes’ rule that allows us to drop the closed
world assumption. We note that the extended Bayes’ rule now depends on the choice of probability level q determining
the quantile sqðTÞ. This reinforces our point that the approach taken here introduces a test on our best model Xðh0Þ (with sig-
niﬁcance level 1 q) in the contamination term of the posterior belief (Eq. (19)). EðLðTÞ; qÞ will jump rapidly from zero to a
very large number, when the least square sum of the whitened discrepancy of Xðh0;wÞ crosses the upper limit sqðTÞ. This will
cause the contamination term eðEðLðTÞ; qÞ; p0Þ to jump from 0 to 1 (see Eq. (18)). Therefore, our choice of EðLðTÞ; qÞ can lead
to strong ﬂuctuations in the contamination term if the discrepancy of the best model Xðh0Þ is hovering around the upper con-
ﬁdence limit. The responsiveness of the contamination term can be reduced by replacing the linear scaling of the exponent of
EðLðTÞ; qÞ with increasing number of observations by a sublinear function:EðLðTÞ; q; bÞ :¼ exp 1
2
Tb
sqðTÞ
T
 s^ðh
0; TÞ
T
  
; with b < b < 1: ð25ÞThe smoothing of the proxy in Eq. (25) comes at the cost of a reduced probability ~q < q that EðLðTÞ; q; bÞ ! 0 for T !1 if the
best model Xðh0Þ is an accurate predictor. If this probability should at least be q, then T1b must grow slower than
v1T ðqÞ  v1T ðqÞ for T !1. For instance, if q ¼ 0:99 and q ¼ 0:95, we have v1T ðqÞ  v1T ðqÞ 

ﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
, and thus b 
 0:5.
The extended Bayes’ rule as described by Eq. (19), Eq. (18) (with k replaced by EðLðTÞ; qÞ) and Eq. (24) or alternatively (25)
has several favorable properties. Due to the additive mixture of the conventional Bayes’ rule with a contamination term, the
calculation of bounds on marginals and moments of the posterior distribution, or any other functional g^ ¼ RH gðhÞ
pðhjyðtÞÞ dh can be separated into (with eðTÞ :¼ eðEðLðTÞ; qÞ; p0Þ)
Fig. 4.
by usin
to zero
e-conta
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Z
H
gðhÞ mðhjyðtÞÞ dhþ eðTÞmin
h2H
gðhÞ; ð26Þ
g ¼ ð1 eðTÞÞ
Z
H
gðhÞ mðhjyðtÞÞ dhþ eðTÞmax
h2H
gðhÞ; ð27Þwhere mðhjyðtÞÞ :¼ lLðhÞ=
R
H lLðhÞdh is the posterior distribution that emerges from application of the conventional Bayes’
rule, and the min/max operations in the second term of the sum derives from the fact that the extreme points of the vacuous
probabilityVðHÞ are constituted by the Dirac measures dðhÞ; h 2 H. Hence, the calculation of g and g requires the separate
application of (i) conventional Bayesian updating techniques and (ii) maximum likelihood estimation to determine the con-
tamination eðEðLðTÞ; qÞ; p0Þ (see Eq. (24) or (25)). Although the set of eligible AR(m) processes associated with an accurate
predictor is limited by constraints (A.5) and (A.11), those problems would still need to be solved for a high dimensional
parameter space summarizing the AR(m) process parameters and the model parameters hF (see Section 1). In this situation,
it can be useful to restrict the eligible AR(m) processes to the set of AR(1) or AR(2) processes in a ﬁrst iteration, and only relax
the restriction if the extended Bayes’ rule indicates a lack of accuracy of the model ensemble (eðEðLðTÞ; qÞ; p0Þ ! 1).
Finally, we note that the extended Bayes’ rule can be further extended to allow for imprecise priors on the set of available
models XðhÞ; h 2 H in a straightforward manner. The extension is particularly simple, if the prior is itself an e-contamination
model mðh;w0Þ 2 ð1 ~eÞmðh;w0Þ þ ð1 ~eÞVðH w0Þ. In this case the functional form of the extended Bayes’ rule reduces
again to Eq. (19) with contamination ~eþ eðEðLðTÞ; qÞ; p0Þ ð1 ~eÞ.4. Extended Bayes’ rule: example of AR processes continued
We now put the conceptual framework developed in the previous section into operation for our example of AR processes.
The setup is identical to what was described in Section 2. For the application of the extended Bayes’ rule to this updating
problem, we need to calculate the development of the contamination eðTÞ :¼ eðEðLðTÞ; qÞ; p0Þ for time series of observations
yðTÞ with increasing length. We do this for the random sample of 200 time series from Section 2, and for both choices of
EðLðTÞ; qÞ proposed in Eqs. (24) and (25) (with b ¼ 0:75 in the latter case). We use a prior weight p0 ¼ 0:95 on our model
ensemble Xða1Þ; ja1j 6 a, and choose a quantile sqðTÞ at cumulative probability q ¼ 0:99 as upper limit on the discrepancy
of the accurate predictor.
The lower 5% and upper 95% quantile limits (deduced from the sample of 200 time series) for the value of the contam-
ination eðTÞ are shown in Fig. 4. When using Eq. (24) for determining the proxy estimate EðLðTÞ; qÞ (left panel), the contam-
ination is zero for the cases in which standard Bayesian updating did well (a2 ¼ f0;0:06g). In these cases, the posterior belief
about model accuracy leads to an AR(1) model with a predictive performance that is identical (a2 ¼ 0) or similar (a2 ¼ 0:06)
to the best linear predictors Ph1 for future observations yTþh from the past observation yT (see Section 2). In the remaining
two cases where standard Bayesian updating failed to various degrees, the situation is markedly different. For a2 ¼ 0:9,
the contamination rapidly approaches eðTÞ ¼ 1, rendering our posterior belief vacuous after 100 observations at the latest.
For the case a2 ¼ 0:3, the increase in contamination is slower, and can ﬂuctuate strongly up to T ¼ 4000 observations
depending on the actual time series. The alternative contamination term based on Eq. (25) offers a smoother response
(see right panel, Fig. 4), but on the downside may indicate a non-vanishing contamination even if the model ensembleBehavior of lower and upper bounds of the 90% ‘‘conﬁdence limits” (deduced from the sample of 200 time series) for the e-contamination calculated
g Eq. (24) (left panel) or Eq. (25) (with b ¼ 0:75, right panel). The e-contamination for the models a1 ¼ 0:86 and a2 ¼ f0; 0:06g falls immediately
and stays there throughout the 5000 observations (left panel), or its 95% quantile hovers around e ¼ 0:1—0:3 (right panel). In contrast, the
mination for the model with a2 ¼ 0:9 jumps quickly to one (after 100 observations, both panels).
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application.
We now investigate the impact of a growing contamination in the posterior belief on future predictions of the observation
yTþ4 from the last observation yT for the case a2 ¼ 0:9. Due to the mixture with the vacuous probability model
VðA1Þ; A1 ¼ ½a; a, the posterior belief is imprecise (see Eq. (17)). The upper and lower cumulative distributions (CDFs)
set up by the e-contaminated posterior belief model are given by (cmp. Eqs. (26) and (27)):Fig.
Fig. 6.
dashdoFða1; yðTÞÞ ¼ ð1 eðTÞÞ
Z a1
a
pða01jyðTÞÞ da01 þ eðTÞ Hða1  aÞ; ð28Þ
Fða1; yðTÞÞ ¼ ð1 eðTÞÞ
Z a1
a
pða01jyðTÞÞ da01 þ eðTÞ; ð29Þwhere H denotes the Heavyside function. It is important to note that the distribution band deﬁned by Fða1; yðTÞÞ and
Fða1; yðTÞÞ is not equivalent to the e-contamination model, but a true superset of it.
Fig. 5 shows the change of posterior distribution band with increasing number of observations of an AR(2) process with
a2 ¼ 0:9. It can be seen that the imprecision in the posterior belief increases quickly with observations. After T ¼ 80 obser-
vations the posterior belief becomes vacuous, and the associated distribution band would cover the entire graph. We take a
closer look on the predicted distribution of the observation yTþ4 conditional on the previous observations pðyTþ4jyðTÞÞ in
Fig. 6. The prediction is again imprecise, and its lower and upper bound can be calculated on the basis of Eq. (10) by recalling
that these bounds are set up by the Dirac measures contained in the vacuous probability modelVðA1Þ. Those Dirac measures5. Cumulative posterior distribution bands for the parameter a1 learned from a realization of the AR(2)-process with a1 ¼ 0:86 and a2 ¼ 0:9.
Prediction of the distribution of the observation yTþ4 conditional on the past observation yT for the AR(2)-process with a1 ¼ 0:86 and a2 ¼ 0:9. The
tted line shows the true conditional distribution pðyTþ4jyT ¼ 0Þ.
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contribution to pðyTþ4jyðTÞÞ:pðyTþ4jyðTÞÞ ¼ ð1 eðTÞÞ
Z a
a
pðyTþ4jyT ¼ 0;a1Þ pða1jyðTÞÞ da1 þ eðTÞ minja1 j6a pðyTþ4jyT ¼ 0;a1Þ: ð30Þ
pðyTþ4jyðTÞÞ ¼ ð1 eðTÞÞ
Z a
a
pðyTþ4jyT ¼ 0;a1Þ pða1jyðTÞÞ da1 þ eðTÞ maxja1 j6a pðyTþ4jyT ¼ 0;a1Þ: ð31ÞIt can be seen that the imprecision in the prediction grows quickly. This indicates that the AR(1) model is simply inadequate
to describe the observations.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a framework for updating belief about prediction accuracy across an ensemble of models. While fol-
lowing a Bayesian approach, we have dropped the assumption that an accurate model – predicting the system observations
up to a reasonably constrained AR(m) process – is contained in the model ensemble as would be required by Bayes’ rule. This
is an achievement because the closed world assumption can lead to spurious beliefs about model accuracy and false predic-
tions, as was demonstrated with an example of AR processes. By drawing on elements of imprecise probability theory and
the knowledge of asymptotic distributions for large samples, we established an extension of Bayes’ rule that extends its
consideration to the space of unknown models. Under the extended Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief takes the form of an
e-contamination model, where the contamination e is updated along with the prior belief on the set of available models.
A growing contamination will indicate limited accuracy of the entire model ensemble, and will eventually lead to a vacuous
posterior belief. In this way, a lack of predictive accuracy can be identiﬁed as was demonstrated again with an example of AR
processes. We want to point out that we have not investigated the coherence of the prior and posterior e-contamination
model in the sense of Walley [9, Chapter 6]. This consideration, and the question of its applicability to an open version of
Bayes’ rule, is beyond the scope of the paper.
The method presented here has proved successful – in a stylized example – to discriminate between cases where stan-
dard Bayesian updating works well, and where it fails. However, further research will be required to investigate how the
extended Bayes’ rule works in practice. As a matter of concern, the extended Bayes’ rule in its current form may be too dis-
criminative as it discounts every model that cannot explain the data up to a stationary AR(m) process. In practice, such a
strong requirement is hard to fulﬁll, not the least because the observations might be overlaid by a systematic non-stationary
error due to changing measurement practices over time. This, however, is a general problem for model validation and model-
based prediction, and by no means limited to the application of the extended Bayes’ rule. In these cases it may be unavoid-
able to attempt adding and updating an explicit model for the discrepancies between actual measurements and ‘ideal’ mea-
surements (and, if necessary, between actual model and ‘ideal’ model) to the analysis as has been proposed by [5]. In any
case, the extended Bayes’ rule can be a valuable tool to assess whether such additions are bearing fruit.
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Appendix A. Some properties of auto-regressive processes
An auto-regressive Gaussian process of order m with zero mean is deﬁned byXt :¼
Xm
k¼1
akXtk þ t;
with t  Nð0;rÞ iid; ak 2 R for 1 6 k 6 m; am–0:
ðA:1ÞImportant properties of an AR(m) process can be deduced from its characteristic polynomialPðyÞ ¼ 1
Xm
k¼1
akyk: ðA:2ÞThem roots of PðyÞ are either positive real-valued (yþ), negative real-valued (y), or appear in complex conjugate pairs ðyc; ycÞ
deﬁning a radius r ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃycycp and an angle cos/ ¼ ðyc þ ycÞ=ð2rÞ in the complex plane. An AR(m)-process is weakly stationary if
jykj > 1 for all 1 6 k 6 m [8, Chapter 10.3.5]. The stationarity condition deﬁnes a region A  Rm around the origin of the
Euclidean vector space, in which the parameter vectors ~a ¼ ða1; . . . ;amÞ of stationary AR(m) processes need to be located.
A is non-convex for m > 2.
E. Kriegler / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 583–596 595The auto-correlation function of an AR(m) process with zero mean, i.e.,qðsÞ ¼ EðXtXtþsÞ
EðXtXtÞ ; E being the expectation operator; ðA:3Þprovides information about the memory of the AR(m) process. More precisely, the auto-correlation of lag s can be written as
a sum of decaying (yþ), alternating and decaying (y), and damped oscillatory modes (r;/) characterized by the roots of the
polynomial PðyÞ [8, Chapter 11.1.9]:qðsÞ ¼
X
i
ai
ysi
þ
X
k
aj
rsj
ðcosðs/jÞ þ bj sinðs/jÞÞ; ðA:4Þwhere the m coefﬁcients ai; aj; bj 2 R can be determined from knowledge of qð0Þ; . . . ;qðm 1Þ. In particular, we haveP
iai þ
P
jaj ¼ qð0Þ ¼ 1. Eq. (A.4) shows that the auto-correlation for large lags s will essentially depend on the mode linked
to the root with the smallest absolute value jyj ¼min16k6mjykj, and possibly (if jbjj 	 1) the damped oscillatory mode with
the largest period T ¼ 2p=j/j, j/j ¼minjj/jj. Our deﬁnition of an accurate predictor in Section 1 requires that the param-
eters~a of the AR(m) can be deduced, in principle, from the discrepancy between model and observations. Inter alia, this puts
a limit on the persistence of auto-correlations. More precisely, we require that (i) the e-folding time of its slowest decaying
mode (at which it reaches 1=e of its initial value) covers at most a quarter of the observational period, and (ii) its longest
damped oscillation has a period no longer than half of the observational period. Hence, for a given number of observations
T, an eligible AR(m) process associated with an accurate predictor must fulﬁll the following conditions:jyjP e
4
T ; j/jP
4p
T
: ðA:5ÞThe auto-correlation function qðsÞ is completely determined by the process parameters ~a via the Yule-Walker equations [8,
Chapter 11.1.6]Rm~a0 ¼ ~q0;
with ~q ¼ ðqð1Þ; . . . ;qðmÞÞ; Rm ¼
1 qð1Þ . . . qðm 1Þ
qð1Þ 1 . . . qðm 2Þ
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
.
qðm 1Þ qðm 2Þ . . . 1
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA;
ðA:6Þwhere the mm-matrix Rm is proportional to the auto-covariance matrix of the AR(m)-process [8, Chapters 10.3.2,11.1.1]Rm ¼ cð0Þ Rm; with cð0Þ ¼ r
2
1~a~q0 the variance ofX: ðA:7ÞThus, Rm is positive-deﬁnite and accessible to a Cholesky decomposition [6, Chapter 3.1]:Rm ¼ L0DmL; ðA:8Þ
with D11 ¼ 1; Diiji>1 ¼ Pi1j¼1 ð1 /2jjÞ diagonal elements of Dm,L ¼
1 0 . . . 0 0
/11 1 . . . 0 0
..
. ..
. . .
. ..
. ..
.
/m1;1 /m1;2 . . . /m1;m1 1
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA;where the coefﬁcients /ij, 1 6 j 6 i 6 m 1, can be calculated recursively from knowledge of the variance cð0Þ and the auto-
correlations ðqð1Þ; . . . :qðm 1ÞÞwith the Durbin-Levinson algorithm [2, Chapter 2.5]. The series /11; . . . :/m1m1 is called the
partial auto-correlation function of the AR(m) process [8, Chapters 11.1.10–12], [2, Chapters 3.2].
Since the process parameters~a;r determine the covariance matrix Rm ¼ cð0ÞRm, and by recursion the auto-covariances at
larger lags s > m, an analytical expression for the probability that a time series xðTÞ of length T > m is a realization of a par-
ticular AR(m) process Xð~a;rÞ can be obtained [8, Chapter 12.2.4]:pðxðTÞj~a;rÞ ¼
exp  12 x
0R1m x
cð0Þ2 þ
PT
t¼mþ1
ðxta1xt1...amxtmÞ2
r2
  
ð2pÞT2rTmcð0Þm2 jRmj
1
2
¼ PTt¼1
exp  12 ðxtmtÞ
2
d2t
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p
dt
;
with m1 ¼ 0; mtj26t6m :¼
Xt1
i¼1
/t1;i xti; mtjt>m :¼
Xm
j¼1
ajxtj; dtjt6m ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
cð0ÞDtt
p
; dtjt>m ¼ r;
ðA:9Þ
596 E. Kriegler / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 583–596where the factorization of the probability is achieved by using the Cholesky decomposition (A.8) of Rm. Eq. (A.9) can be used
to estimate the parameters a; r that maximize the likelihood of a given time series x being a realization of an AR(m) process.
The precision of the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) will be limited by the number of observations T. We use the
properties of the MLE to come up with a rough constraint on the order of AR(m) processes that might be estimated with rea-
sonable error from a given time series of length T. The error of the MLE is asymptotically normal with covariance matrix
Vm ¼ T1 R1m ð1~a~q0Þ [6, Chapter 3.2]. Hence, the average axis length of the error ellipsoid describing one standard devia-
tion from the maximum likelihood estimate a^ 2 Rm is (asymptotically) jVmj1=2m. We ask that it should be smaller than unity
which is a typical length scale of the region of stationarity of an AR(m) process (jamj 6 1 for arbitrary order m),T
1
2m ð1~a~q0Þ 12m Pmi¼2 D
 12m
ii 6 T
 12m ð1~a~q0Þm22m < 1; ðA:10Þ
where we used the fact Dii ! 1~a~q0 from above for i! mþ 1. Thus,m < 2þ  ln T
lnð1~a~q0Þ
 
: ðA:11ÞSince 0 < 1~a~q0 6 1 for stationary processes, the second term of the sum is always positive. Constraint (A.11) restricts the
order of eligible AR(m) hypotheses (in terms of precision of MLE) depending on (i) the number of observations and (ii) the
memory in the time series x.
Appendix B. Likelihood of the AR(1) process parameter a
Let an AR(1) process be deﬁned by Xt ¼ aXt1 þ nt , and nt  Nð0;rÞ. Estimators aðTÞ for the parameter a and sðTÞ for the
variance of the AR(1) process can be deﬁned in terms of a segment XðTÞ ¼ ðX1; . . . ;XTÞ:sðTÞ ¼ 1
T  1
XT
t¼1
X2t ; aðTÞ ¼
1
T  1
PT
t¼2 XtXt1
sðTÞ : ðB:1ÞHere, we deviate from the standard choice of these estimators [8, Chapter 12.1] by omitting the subtraction of the mean
(1=T
PT
t¼1Xt ! 0 for T !1), and by inﬂating the estimator for the parameter by aT=ðT  1Þ. From Eq. (A.9),pðXðTÞja;rÞ  e
 1
2r2
PT
t¼2
ðXtaXt1Þ2þX21 ð1a2Þ
 
¼ e
ðT1Þ sðTÞ
2r2
1þa22aaðTÞ
a2 ðX2
1
þX2
T
Þ
ðT1Þ sðTÞ
 
:Once we have observed an actual realization xðTÞ ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xTÞ, we can determine the estimates a^ðTÞ and s^ðTÞ, and calculate a
likelihood functionLða; xðTÞÞ  pðxðTÞja;rÞ for the parameter a of the underlying AR(1) process (assuming that r is known).
Withr^ðTÞ :¼ rﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðT  1Þ s^ðTÞp ; b^ðTÞ :¼
x21 þ x2T
ðT  1Þ s^ðTÞ ; ðB:2Þwe ﬁndLða; xðTÞÞ  e
1
2r^ðTÞ2
ðaa^ðTÞÞ2b^ðTÞa2ð Þ  N a^ðTÞ
1 b^ðTÞ ;
r^ðTÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 b^ðTÞ
q
0
B@
1
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